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C ONFLICT of laws involves problems conveniently grouped under the
headings of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments. During the
previous survey period the major development in Texas concerned choice
of law principles. This year, however, the major developments occurred
nationally in all three areas.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction of the Person
Formal judicial resolution of civil disputes requires that there be juris-
diction. Jurisdiction has many aspects, I one of which, judicial jurisdiction,
raises the question of what limits the Constitution places on the attempts of
the courts of one state to render binding judgments against the citizens of
another state. 2 More specifically, judicial jurisdiction focuses on the po-
tential deprivation of a defendant's due process protections. 3
In 1977 the Supreme Court announced in Shaffer v. Heitner4 that the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" rule of Interna-
tional Shoe5 would apply to in rem and quasi in rem actions as well as to
in personam actions. 6 Further, the Court stated that the tripartite relation-
ship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation 7 should be ex-
* A.B., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Baylor University.
1. The question of jurisdiction can be broken down into two basic categories, legisla-
tive and judicial. Legislative jurisdiction deals "with whether the state, through its courts or
otherwise, has power to act upon the matter in issue by using the state's rules of law to
regulate or control it." R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 3 (3d ed. 1977). Judicial
jurisdiction deals more with the power of a court to act "against the particular person...
against whom, or the thing against which, the court is asked to act." Id In order to have
judicial jurisdiction a court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter involved, as well
as over the person. In order to satisfy subject matter jurisdiction, examination of statutory
as well as constitutional authority may be sufficient. For the court to have jurisdiction over
the person, however, both procedural and substantive due process requirements must be
satisfied. Use of the term "jurisdiction" then requires observation of both the legislative and
judicial categories. See id
2. See id
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Substantive due process requires that a state have some
basis for exercising power. Procedural due process addresses the question of whether the
defendant was given adequate notice of the proceedings and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, §§ 20-21.
4. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. 433 U.S. at 207.
7. Id at 204.
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amined in determining constitutional limits. This new formulation raised
three major questions. First, was the formulation meant to be conjunctive
or disjunctive? Secondly, what were the proper meanings of the elements
of this new tripartite test? Thirdly, to what extent does this approach apply
to cases involving status? 8 During the survey period the United States
Supreme Court handed down two decisions that helped to provide some
insight into the first two questions,9 and a Texas court of civil appeals ad-
dressed the third.' 0
Conjunctive or Disjunctive. In Rush v. Savchuk the Supreme Court dealt
with the question of whether the tripartite test was conjunctive or disjunc-
tive. The Rush case arose from an application of the territoriality principle
to a quasi in rem action based on an insurance policy. Two Indiana resi-
dents were involved in an automobile accident in Indiana. After the colli-
sion the plaintiff changed his residence from Indiana to Minnesota. The
defendant's insurer, however, did business in both Indiana and Minnesota.
8. Possibly, the result could be different in a true in rem admiralty situation.
9. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980). In addition to these major Supreme Court decisions there were many
federal and state court decisions dealing with jurisdiction. See Familia De Boom v. Arosa
Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1980) (when the trial record did not show that due
process requirements for personal jurisdiction had been met, )urisdiction could not be found
to exist by waiver due to refusal by the defendant to answer interrogatories that would have
determined jurisdiction); Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Alabama publisher held amenable to suit by a Texas printer suing on contracts to
be performed in part in Texas); Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 619 F.2d 1132
(5th Cir. 1980) (in determining subject matter jurisdiction, an examination of article II con-
stitutional limits and other statutory grants of power is necessary; when the federal govern-
ment is the defendant, sovereign immunity acts as an additional limit to subject matter
jurisdiction); Hearth, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 612 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1980) (four-
teenth amendment alone does not provide a basis for invoking federal jurisdiction); Hunt v.
BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (res judicata barred an American
citizen from seeking relief in the United States when an English court had proper jurisdic-
tion over the action); K.L. Cattle Co. v. Bunker, 491 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Texas
long-arm statute does not provide for jurisdiction over a nonresident executor or administra-
tor); Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (a
Japanese corporation was not doing business under the Texas long-arm statute when no
evidence showed that any part of the performance of a purchase agreement occurred in
Texas and when the corporation's only contacts within the state were contacts by two of its
agents over a seven-month period to initiate the incorporation of a subsidiary); Sherman
Gin Co. v. Planters Gin Co., 599 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (a contract to be performed by a Texas corporation for a Mississippi corporation,
wholly within Mississippi, provided no basis for exercise of jurisdiction in Texas); Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Lummis, 596 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no
writ) (affirming jurisdiction in a suit on a note when the nonresident maker had transacted
business with a Texas bank); DeJulio v. Lawler, 593 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Texas could exercise personal jurisdiction over a limited part-
nership and its general partner, formed under California law, because it had limited partners
in Texas and the suit involved land in Texas); Walker v. Associates Financial Servs. Corp.,
588 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when out-of-state lender
loaned money to a Texas resident, contractual provision stipulating that transaction would
be governed by laws of state in which lender was licensed and regulated was valid).
10. Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
1I. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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The plaintiff thus brought suit in Minnesota under the Seider v. Roth 12
rationale, attaching the insurer's obligation to the insured. The Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld such an assertion of jurisdiction 3 not only under
the legacy of Harris v. Balk,14 but also by later characterizing the cause of
action so as to satisfy the Shaffer test, despite the absence of contacts be-
tween the defendant and the forum.' 5 The issue was thus squarely
presented to the Court: in a quasi in rem suit, in which jurisdiction is
based solely on the contractual obligation of the insurer to defend its in-
sured, must all three prongs of the Shaffer test be satisfied? The Supreme
Court answered this question in the affirmative and discussed a threefold
litany of substantive due process as it applies to judicial jurisdiction:1 6 the
application of International Shoe standards to all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction; 17 a recitation of the standard as involving, in the case of ab-
sent defendants, "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' "; 18 and an inquiry into the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.' 9
The first argument the Court dealt with in Rush was that the test was
satisfied by the facts at bar because the defendant owned property in the
forum state. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, stating that the
argument rested on legal fictions that could not be allowed to obscure the
lack of true contact between the defendant and the forum state.20 The
majority stressed the necessity of fairly applying the previously enunciated
standards of due process.2' Thus, mere presence of property is not suffi-
cient constitutionally to assert jurisdiction.
The majority did not accept a characterization of the insurance policy as
the primary focus of the suit so as to provide sufficient contacts. As the
majority correctly noted, the insurance policy was neither the basis of the
suit nor did it have any relation to the "operative facts of the negligence
action."' 22 In fact the insurance policy only related to matters pertaining to
the conduct of the litigation and certain consequences of such litigation.
According to the Court, this relationship provided an insufficient contact
between the litigation in question and the forum.23
The majority also rejected the fictions of debt situs and corporate pres-
ence based on business activities within a state. "State Farm is 'found,' in
12. 17 N.Y.2d Il, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
13. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976).
14. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
15. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978).
16. 444 U.S. at 327-30.
17. As the Court noted in Shaffer, however, some situations such as marital status cases
do not necessarily fit within the International Shoe context. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
19. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
20. 444 U.S. at 328.
21. Id
22. Id at 329.
23. Id at 329-30.
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the sense of doing business, in all 50 States and the District of Columbia.
Under appellee's theory, the 'debt' owed to Rush would be 'present' in
each of those jurisdictions simultaneously. It is apparent that such a 'con-
tact' can have no jurisdictional significance." '24
A final argument addressed by the Court attributed the insurer's forum
contacts to the defendant by characterizing the attachment procedure as
the "functional equivalent of a direct action against the insurer. '25 Such a
characterization drew heavily on two assertions: first, that any liability is
limited to the policy amount and thus involves no personal liability of the
defendant;26 secondly, that any judgment against the defendant would be
satisfied from the policy proceeds available only for that purpose.27 Ac-
cording to the direct action argument, it is therefore fair to consider an
insured as a "nominal defendant" in a suit designed to obtain jurisdiction
over the insurance company. This argument and its underlying characteri-
zations, however, were rejected by the Court. As the majority correctly
points out, any exercise of judicial jurisdiction requires a constitutionally
fair assertion of power over the nominal defendant. 28 Only after such a
proper exercise of judicial power can the insurer be brought in as a gar-
nishee.
The crux of the majority's analysis of the direct action argument relates
to how suits regarding absent defendants must be characterized. Under
Shaffer the relationships to be examined involve the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. 29 Under the direct action approach the focus of the in-
quiry is shifted to the relationship "among the plaintiff, the forum, the
insurer, and the litigation. ' 30 If this shift is permitted, the plaintiffs con-
tacts with the forum become determinant of the defendant's due process
rights. According to the Court, "[s]uch an approach is forbidden by Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny."'3'
Meanings of the Elements. This issue was addressed in the case of World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,32 a products liability suit. The plain-
tiffs purchased an Audi automobile in New York and subsequently left
New York for a new home in Arizona. While driving in Oklahoma, the
plaintiffs were hit from behind and a fire ensued. The plaintiffs brought
suit in Oklahoma against, among others,33 the wholesale dealer and the





28. Id. at 330-32.
29. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
30. Id at 332.
31. Id
32. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
33. Plaintiffs joined as defendants the automobile manufacturer, Audi; the importer,
Volkswagen of America; the regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.; and the
retail dealer, Seaway. Id at 288.
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fices in New York. As a wholesaler, World-Wide distributed vehicles,
parts, and accessories under contract with a German automobile manufac-
turer to retail dealers in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. Seaway,
the retailer, did business only in New York. Both wholesaler and retailer
were "fully independant corporations whose relations with each other and
with Volkswagen and Audi [were] contractual only.' '34 As to these defend-
ants no showing was made that any automobile, other than that of the
plaintiffs, sold by either had ever entered Oklahoma.
The majority viewed the facts as revealing "a total absence of those affil-
iating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-
court jurisdiction" 35 because the defendants did not sell or service cars in
Oklahoma, did not generally avail themselves of privileges or benefits of
Oklahoma law, did not solicit business in ways reasonably calculated to
reach Oklahoma, and did not regularly sell directly or indirectly to
Oklahoma customers.36 "In short," the Court noted, "[the plaintiffs] seek
to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences
can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi
automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer
an accident while passing through Oklahoma." 37 The World- Wide Volk-
swagen majority viewed the question of a defendant's contacts as one ne-
cessitating a specific purposeful act by which the defendant invoked a
benefit, the privilege of conducting activities, from the forum state. Such a
view narrowly traces the absent defendant's activities and thus limits the
viability of the effects doctrine.38
Furthermore, the majority found little reason to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial activity. Rather, the opinion character-
ized any expansion of the effects doctrine as an adoption of foreseeability
as a fairness standard. As the Court stated, if foreseeability were the test,
then "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent
for service of process."' 39 The majority considered this test to be analogous
to the Harris v. Balk4° rule that was rejected in the companion Rush
case.41 The Court in World- Wide Volkswagen held that unless the absent
defendant's conduct, whether under the guise of foreseeability or enjoy-
34. Id at 289.
35. Id. at 295.
36. Id
37. Id
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971) provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of
action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the
individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction un-
reasonable.
See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
39. 444 U.S. at 296.
40. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
41. 444 U.S. at 296; see 444 U.S. at 327-30.
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ment of financial benefits accruing from a collateral relation to the forum,
is such that he should reasonably anticipate being taken to court, then ju-
risdiction cannot be exercised.42
An uncertainty after World- Wide Volkswagen is the role to be played by
interstate federalism in the due process limitations on the exercise of judi-
cial jurisdiction.43 The Court described the fairness doctrine as perform-
ing two related but distinguishable functions: "It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it
acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a fed-
eral system."" Rejection of a pure territoriality approach to judicial juris-
diction was not intended, however, to suggest that state lines were
irrelevant. Instead these lines are no longer absolutely determinative. The
power to try cases, a basic attribute of sovereignty, was retained by the
individual states, but it had to be exercised within a federal system. This
required "a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limi-
tation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment. '45 According to the Court this meant
that the state must at least have certain contacts with the defendant. The
Court recognized, however, that jurisdiction cannot be exercised in every
case in which the state has certain contacts with the defendant:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if
the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the contro-
versy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for the
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of inter-
state federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to
render a valid judgment.4 6
The importance of "interstate federalism" needs to be determined. The
use of this term could mean that there is a new fourth element in judicial
jurisdiction under due process. Conversely, it could mean that there is a
duality to the forum state's interest in the tripartite test. In either case the
result is the same; the forum state must not only have an affirmative inter-
est in the controversy but that interest must be such that it will support the
exercise of jurisdiction without unduly affecting the sovereign rights of
other states. According to these requirements a court must consider a con-
troversy as would an impartial observer, asking which state's or states' sov-
42. Id at 297.
43. Some cases already have begun the process of accommodating the principles an-
nounced in World- Wide Volkswagen. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1980) (Japanese manufacturer of millions of cigarette lighters sold in the United States held
amenable to suit in Texas); Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (shipowner held subject to jurisdiction of a Texas court in a suit by a seaman, even
though accident occurred in Great Britian, when base of shipowner's operation was in
Texas).
44. 444 U.S. at 292.
45. Id at 293.
46. Id at 294.
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ereignty is actually involved in a given dispute. Such an approach offers
an alternative determinant in cases in which a focus on the defendant's
contacts, particularly under the effects test, is not clear.
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwel 47 was such a case and is therefore
useful in illustrating the potential of such an approach. In that case a Del-
aware corporation, with its principal offices in Texas, attempted a takeover
of a corporation having its principal office and assets in Idaho. When
compliance with the Idaho takeover statute presented a problem, the Texas
purchaser filed suit in Texas to enjoin enforcement of the statute by Idaho
state officials. Even if one were to agree with the Fifth Circuit that the
Idaho defendant did foresee or should have foreseen the effect that en-
forcement of the Idaho statute would have on a Texas corporation's busi-
ness plans, thereby satisfying the defendant's contacts requirement, 48 the
needs of interstate federalism, nevertheless, might well have prevented an
exercise of jurisdiction. An impartial observer of the facts in this case
would undoubtedly conclude that Idaho was the best forum for litigating
this dispute. If not, then the kind of self-restraint necessarily owed sover-
eign coequals would be entirely missing.
As has been suggested, this concept of interstate federalism might logi-
cally be considered as a new fourth element or as an indication that the
forum state's interest has a dual nature. Unless this concept is analogized
to the defendant's contacts element of the "fairness" test, however, at least
one technical problem arises. According to the language of the majority
opinion in World- Wide Volkswagen "the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State
of its power to render a valid judgment. '49 To the extent that this lan-
guage applies to the forum state, it cannot be waived by the defendant.50
As a result, successful collateral attacks would be possible and would be
functionally equivalent to those attacks based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Furthermore, as the state whose sovereignty is violated would
not normally be present before the forum state court, when a final judg-
ment is brought to the state for enforcement it could, and if it were acting
parochially would, raise the issue on its own motion. Surely this result is
unintended and counterproductive. If this result did occur, however, a
special type of collateral estoppel could be applied to prevent it.51
Status Cases. Exercise of judicial jurisdiction in cases involving family
relationships has always involved special considerations. In the era of Pen-
47. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443
U.S. 173 (1979). See generally Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34
Sw. L.J. 385, 389 (1980).
48. 577 F.2d at 1267.
49. 444 U.S. at 294.
50. In the case of personal jurisdiction a general appearance subjects the defendant to
the court's power. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 30.
51. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974) (Supreme Court
fashioned a special doctrine of collateral estoppel for use in admiralty).
1981]
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noyer v. Neff52 the language but not the complete rationale of territoriality
applied. The Court in Pennoyer spoke of a marriage "res. ' '53 Even though
the Court in Shaffer eliminated the differences between suits in personam,
quasi in rem, and in rem, it nonetheless cited with approval Justice Field's
opinion in Pennoyer, and stated that Field "carefully noted that cases in-
volving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce actions, could
be adjudicated in the plaintiffs home State even though the defendant
could not be served within that State."' 54 As a result, after Shaffer two
major questions in this area developed. When does a case involve status?
Once a case is determined to involve status, what are the specific require-
ments of fairness? Kulko v. Superior Court55 addressed the first question
and held that a claim for a support order is not a status case, thus render-
ing Shaffer inapplicable.56 Divorce cases have long been held to be status
cases.
57
Perry v. Ponder58 addressed both the status and the fairness issues. The
52. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
53. Id at 734-35.
54. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201 (1977). The due process clause still applied to
such cases, but "fairness" was defined differently. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 298-99 (1942) (divorce decree based on substituted service held valid); Wicks v. Cox,
146 Tex. 489, 493, 208 S.W.2d 876, 878 (1948) (jurisdiction over custody of children upheld
based on state duty to provide for their welfare).
55. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
56. Id at 100-01.
57. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
58. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). For other cases involving
jurisdiction in status cases, see Felch v. Felch, 605 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980,
no writ) (jurisdiction attached to suit filed by mother in Texas for divorce and child custody,
even though children were with their father in Washington, because domicile of children
was in Texas); Cossey v. Cossey, 602 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ)
(trial court's refusal to assume jurisdiction over mother and children who had been absent
from Texas for more than a year prior to the father's filing suit upheld); Oliver v. Boutwell,
601 SW.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (special standards of inconvenience
of the parties or forum are not to be considered as obstacles to jurisdiction in a modification
of conservatorship suit, as long as due process is satisfied); Bergdoll v. Whitley, 598 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ) (contacts not sufficient to warrant personal juris-
diction over the nonresident in a suit to increase child support payments when the only
contact that he had with Texas was that his former wife lived there with his children);
Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ) (district court
had jurisdiction to grant a divorce because it was an in rem proceeding, but the court did not
have personal jurisdiction over the parties because they had not been married in Texas, the
wife had never been a resident of Texas, the children had never been before the court, and
no proof existed that they had ever been in Texas); Bragdon v. Bragdon, 594 S.W.2d 561
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (judgment against husband for past-due support
and maintenance payments based on Alabama divorce decree and Connecticut property
settlement held enforceable, and husband precluded from attacking such decree because he
acquiesced in the decree by remarrying another person); Ex rel D.N.S., 592 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (putative father held not subject to jurisdiction in
Texas when his only alleged contact with the state was that the child resided in Texas ac-
cording to his directives or approval); Crockett v. Crockett, 589 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (Texas Family Code's long-arm statute was valid, and
refusal to give extraterritorial effect to the concept of continuing jurisdiction with respect to
a foreign divorce court was justified); Alston v. Rains, 589 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, no writ) (Arkansas probate court had jurisdiction to determine guardian-
ship of the child, and full faith and credit was to be granted Arkansas decree in Texas);
Brock v. Brock, 586 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) (trial court did not
[Vol. 35
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plaintiff-mother in Perry brought suit for child support and custody. She
and the father had formerly lived in Alabama, were divorced in Alabama,
and she moved to Texas with the child after having been awarded custody
by the Alabama divorce court. Apparently the child was taken to Texas
without the father's consent. About ten months after the divorce, and
about six and one-half months after the mother had moved to Texas with
the child, the father obtained a modification of the Alabama decree grant-
ing him custody. The mother then filed suit in Texas, and the father spe-
cially appeared, claiming that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him. Because this case was one of child support and custody, the court had
to confront the support question. The court correctly noted that Kulko
had held that support cases were not status cases; therefore the fairness test
of Shaffer applied and personal jurisdiction would not exist because the
father did not purposefully benefit from any activities relating to the forum
state.59 This conclusion raised the question of whether the fairness test of
Shaffer should apply to custody cases.
Two main differences between support cases and custody cases prevent
Kulko from mandating application of Shaffer. First is the fact that a sup-
port order is a judgment establishing a direct obligation to pay,60 whereas
custody can be enforced without necessarily requiring affirmative action
by the nonresident parent. 6' Secondly, "although in both types of litiga-
tion the interests of the child should be paramount, the child's interests are
less easily identified with the interests of one parent if the issue is custody
rather than support."'62 Of course, the presence of the child within the
state asserting jurisdiction is important in this connection, and if the child
is not present, then minimum contacts with the defendant parent may well
be necessary. 63 As the court in Perry noted, there is a real disadvantage in
any rule that would allow a court to adjudicate custody but not allow it to
render a support decree.64 This possibility is, however, inherent in
Kulko.65 In most instances a statutory answer exists: the adoption of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.66
The Perry court quite properly concluded that the United States
abuse its discretion in prohibiting former wife from taking child out of state without written
permission of court and with notice to father of child).
59. 604 S.W.2d at 312; see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 89 (1978); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
60. 604 S.W.2d at 313. Courts of the state of a party's residence are usually in a better
position to determine the circumstances bearing on the ability to pay. Id
61. A court acting in the best interests of the child must theoretically be willing to
award custody to the nonresident. To the extent, therefore, that a constitutional exercise of
jurisdiction depends on the question of whether a judgment has only a negative effect on the
nonresident instead of requiring an affirmative obligation, a determination on the merits
awarding custody to the nonresident results in a loss of the court's jurisdiction.
62. 604 S.W.2d at 313 (citing Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 229, 233 (1979)).
63. See Oliver v. Boutwell, 601 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
64. 604 S.W.2d at 313.
65. See Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J. 965,
981 (1978).
66. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1968). The Act has been
19811
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Supreme Court's decision in May v. Andersen67 was not dispositive of ei-
ther the status or fairness issues.68 As to the proper characterization of
custody cases, the court noted that custody of children is a status or rela-
tionship in precisely the same manner as the existence or nonexistence of a
marriage. 69 A state has at least as great an interest in the custody of chil-
dren as it has in a marriage.70 Furthermore, as the interests of the children
should be paramount, some basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is practi-
cally necessary for a child residing within the state's borders. 7'
If jurisdiction in a child custody case is to be exercised over the absent
parent-defendant who has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state, two basic theoretical ap-
proaches apply. First, the absent defendant's needs can be considered as
much as possible within the context of the needs and interests of the plain-
tiff-parent, the child, and the forum state. As the discussion in the Perry
case made clear, this approach is the better of the two. Secondly, the ab-
sent defendant can be ignored, and the action can be treated as one involv-
ing only the present parent and child. As status cases permit application of
an undefined, particularized standard of fairness, 72 commentators have
suggested that status is a res that may be determined wholly without re-
gard to minimum contacts.73 Alternately, a custody case could be viewed
as one involving only subject matter jurisdiction, namely the status of a
child, and, therefore, jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is ren-
dered unnecessary.74
Both of these approaches suffer from a common deficiency by ignoring
adopted in both Alabama and Texas. See ALA. CODE, tit. 34, §§ 105-123 (1959); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon 1975).
67. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
68. 604 S.W.2d at 320-21. The court cited several reasons why May did not control.
First, May did not involve the situation in which the state that rendered the child custody
decree was also the residence of one of the parents and the child. Secondly, the May opin-
ion was agreed to by only a plurality, not a majority, and therefore is only persuasive and
not authoritative. Thirdly, since May was handed down, other cases, such as Shaffer, have
been rendered. Finally, May does not necessarily address itself to the best interests of the
child, the proper basis for a decision according to most legal scholars; rather, it looks to the
rights of parents. Id at 321.
69. Divorce cases provide the primary exception to a standard application of the due
process fairness test. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
70. 604 S.W.2d at 315 (citing Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 494, 208 S.W.2d 876, 878
(1948) and Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 145, 112 S.W.2d 165, 168 (1938)).
71. 604 S.W.2d at 315 (citing Hazard, May Y. Anderson.: Preamble to Family Law
Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379, 387 (1959), Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH.
L. REV. 795, 827 (1964), and Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV.
657, 661 (1959)). Child custody has usually been seen as a status that can be determined by
the child's domicile. See Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 76, 194 S.W.2d 551, 555 (1946);
Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ).
72. See generally Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 62, at 230; Developments
in the Law--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1240 (1980).
73. See 604 S.W.2d at 314-16.
74. Id at 322. This procedure was used in two other cases. See Thornlow v. Thornlow,
576 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 1596, 63 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980); Hilt v. Kirkpatrick, 538 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
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the basic, logical reality accepted in Shaffer. In that case the Supreme
Court accepted the fact that a defendant's interest in the matter in litiga-
tion is necessarily and always affected in a civil suit. 75 As a result, the due
process clause must be viewed with the individual in mind. Whether or
not the same fairness standards apply or are to be applied in a similar
manner, the court in the Perry case is correct in rejecting those approaches
to judicial jurisdiction that eschew this basic holding. Treating child cus-
tody cases as res cases or cases involving only subject matter jurisdiction is
clearly improper. Indeed, as the court notes, the logical extension of these
approaches is that the absent defendant need not even be notified, a con-
clusion that belies the rationale of Shaffer, the teachings of Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,76 and common sense.77
Due process requires that a forum state inquire:
into the circumstances of the parties and the child for the purpose of
determining whether the child and the [plaintiff-parent] have been in
Texas long enough to give this state a sovereign's interest in and re-
sponsibility for the child's welfare and to provide access to sufficient
evidence to make an informed decision concerning the child's best
interests. If the court determines on this basis that due process has
been satisfied, the court should then inquire as to whether the child's
interests would be better served by an adjudication of custody by the
courts of [the absent defendant's domicile or some other state]. 78
Perhaps this test could be molded in terms of Shaffer to require that a
jurisdictional inquiry focus on the relationship among the plaintiff, the fo-
rum, and the litigation.
Some statutory basis for the exercise of jurisdiction must exist, or the
court is without power to act. Consequently, an examination of the appli-
cable statutory provisions for an affirmative grant is important. The Texas
Family Code contains not only specific enumerations but also a blanket
jurisdictional grant on "any basis consistent with the constitutions of this
state or the United States for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction. 79
The obvious intent of this provision is to assert jurisdiction in the broadest
possible sense.80 Facts falling under either the specific grants or the ge-
neric grant must, however, still pass constitutional muster; that is, they
must pass the test of fairness in child custody cases.
The court in Perry formulated the test in a child custody case so as to
require that the plaintiff, the forum, and the litigation have sufficient con-
tacts. The plaintiff could be either an individual or the state in the case of
an emergency. In a true emergency the mere presence of the child would
suffice; otherwise the parent would need to have resided in the state for a
75. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977).
76. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
77. 604 S.W.2d at 316.
78. Id at 318.
79. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
80. See generally U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977);
Weintraub, supra note 65.
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sufficient period of time to establish legitimate relations. The forum has
sufficient contacts when its interest in and responsibility for the child's wel-
fare exist affirmatively and are not clearly outweighed by those of another
state. The litigation has sufficient contacts when it is possible to obtain
sufficient evidence to make a properly informed decision concerning the
child's best interests. Further, as the court notes in Perry8 while this ap-
proach does not necessarily show that the defendant has intentionally
availed himself of the benefits of the forum state, nonetheless the defend-
ant is affected and must be notified under the teachings of Mullane.82
While this approach does not mean that there has to be a nonstatus show-
ing of minimum contacts, it does mean that if the status requirement of
due process is met, then a state court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Of course, the jurisdiction may not extend to the imposition of
a purely personal duty.83
While the standard announced in Perry is imprecise, it is no less precise
than the area of due process requirements generally. One very material
difference, however, exists: concurrent jurisdiction may result in the courts
of more than one state, a possibility that could clearly be detrimental to a
proper determination of custody. The more affluent parent, once an ame-
nable jurisdiction is found, may litigate the other parties into final, often
unhappy, submission. No complete answer exists to this problem. Of
course, the fact that two states could exercise jurisdiction does not mean
that they would do so or that they would reach different results. Even if
they did, application of full faith and credit to a custody decree would be a
possible solution. While full faith and credit is an unsettled matter of fed-
eral constitutional law,84 Texas law does give custody decrees full faith
and credit.85 In other states the doctrine of comity is used.8 6 In either case
changed circumstances allow the issue to be relitigated by any court with
jurisdiction.8 7
81. 604 S.W.2d at 316.
82. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
83. See note 61 supra.
84. See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 244; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.3B (2d ed. 1980); Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act." A Legislative Remedyfor Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1207, 1210-13 (1969).
85. See Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1966).
86. See 604 S.W.2d at 319.
87. Excessive litigation is clearly not in the best interests of justice of the child whose
custody is in question. The Texas Family Code addresses this problem in the context of a
child and managing conservator who have left Texas and have lived in another state for
more than six months. Section 11.052 provides that unless there is a written agreement
regarding the continuing jurisdiction of the original supervisory court, that court may not
exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 11.052(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); Solender, Family Law. Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 159, 160-61 (1980). Section 11.053 provides that Texas courts shall recog-
nize and enforce original or modified final decrees of other states so long as that state exer-
cised jurisdiction "substantially in accordance with the jurisdictional prerequisites of this
code." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.053 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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B. Jurisdiction in Estate Tax Cases
Estates of the rich, who seem to have a penchant for travel and for mul-
tiple homes, present special jurisdictional problems when more than one
state lays claim to an estate as being a part of its tax base. Such multiple
taxation, at least in theory, is not permissible. 88 The problem for the estate
and for the individual claimants thereunder is finding a forum to hear
claims of double taxation. Resort to the state courts, given the difficulty of
conclusively fixing domicile, often does not work.89 Use of the Federal
Interpleader Act 90 was disallowed by the Supreme Court in Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley.91 Two years later, however, the Court seemed
to offer some hope to exceptional estates in Texas v. Florida.92 In that case
the Court allowed the invocation of its original jurisdiction over disputes
between the states when the pleading alleged that not all of the claims of
the contending states could be satisfied out of the estate. 93
The death of Howard Hughes is proving to be the basis for a new exami-
nation of the problem of double estate taxation by states. California filed
suit in the Supreme Court against Texas, alleging that the state of Howard
Hughes was insufficient to satisfy the claims of both California and Texas.
Under the authority of Texas v. Florida, this approach seemed appropri-
ate;94 in June 1978, however, the Supreme Court denied California's mo-
tion for leave to file a bill of complaint. 95 Three different concurring
opinions, representing the views of four Justices, suggested that while no
relief was possible by way of an original suit before the Supreme Court,
judgment under the federal interpleader statute96 might be possible. 97 Af-
ter the Supreme Court denied California's motion, the Texas administra-
tors of the Hughes estate filed an interpleader action, Lummis v. White,98
in a federal district court in Texas.
In Lummis the district court determined the parties to be the Texas ad-
88. For the taxation situs of tangible property, see City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 293 U.S. 112, 119 (1934); Union Wefrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S.
194, 206 (1905). For the taxation situs of intangible property, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436 (1980). Intangible personal property may be taxed
only at the place of the owner's domicile. See First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 323
(1932). See generally Tweed & Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain-But What of Domi-
cile, 53 HARV. L. REV. 68 (1939).
89. Compare Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660, 288
U.S. 617 (1932) with Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935) and New Jersey v. Pennsylvania,
287 U.S. 580 (1932) (per curiam) andIn re Estate of Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601,
116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503 (supp. op.) (1934).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
91. 302 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1937).
92. 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
93. Id at 405-10.
94. In the more common estate case, states are unlikely to sue each other in the
Supreme Court. In a celebrated case, however, such as that of Howard Hughes, such action
is predictable.
95. California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 601 (1978) (per curiam).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
97. 437 U.S. at 602 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 614 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at
616 (Powell, J., concurring).
98. 491 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 629 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ministrator of the Hughes estate on one side, and the United States and the
states of California and Texas on the other.99 This alignment caused
problems with establishing diversity jurisdiction even under the minimal
diversity requirements of interpleader actions.'0° The court found that
minimal diversity was lacking because the United States is not a "citizen of
a state" for diversity purposes,' 0' and a state is not a citizen of itself for
federal diversity purposes. 10 2 The interpleader claim was, therefore, dis-
missed for want of diversity. 10 3
On appeal the Fifth Circuit characterized its task as deciding "whether
the federal system that has spawned Lummis' dilemma of double taxation
provides him with a remedy.'1°4 As this formulation of the issue makes
clear, common sense demands that there be some available forum for con-
clusively determining domicile and therefore death taxes. After noting
that four Justices of the Supreme Court supported the use of the federal
interpleader statute, 10 5 the court turned to the question of the diversity
necessary in an interpleader action. 106 The court concluded that only min-
imal diversity was required among the claimants, and that the citizenship
of an interested stakeholder may be considered for purposes of this show-
ing of minimal diversity. 107 The court thus held that the district court had
jurisdiction. 0 8
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. The Constitutional Question
In the case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague 109 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of the meaning of the due process and full faith
clauses in choice of law decisions. In Hague the cause of action arose out
of an automobile and motorcycle accident that occurred in Wisconsin near
the Minnesota line. The passenger on the motorcycle was killed, and his
wife sued his insurance carrier seeking recovery under uninsured motorist
coverage. The motorcycle passenger lived in Wisconsin at the time of
death, but had worked across the state line in Minnesota for fifteen years.
While living in Wisconsin, the decedent had purchased insurance coverage
from Allstate. After the accident, the widow moved to Minnesota where
she established her residence. She later married a resident of Minnesota,
sought and obtained appointment as a personal representative of the estate
99. 491 F. Supp. at 7.
100. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1335 (1976); J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 627-28 (2d ed. 1974).
101. 491 F. Supp. at 8; see Kent v. Northern Cal. Regional Office of Am. Friends Serv.
Comm., 497 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. 491 F. Supp. at 8; see Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
103. 491 F. Supp. at 8.
104. 629 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1980).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
106. 629 F.2d at 399.
107. Id at 399-401.
108. Id at 403.
109. 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981).
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of her deceased husband in Minnesota, and then filed suit in Minnesota
against Allstate. After finding that it had jurisdiction and after refusing to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, the Minnesota trial court
applied Minnesota law and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. " 10
On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the application of Minnesota law,
indicating that the due process and full faith clauses act as a rather limited
check on state choice of law power."II This conclusion, however, was
reached without majority agreement on the underlying principles and their
proper application to the facts.
The plurality opinion 1 2 viewed the due process clause and the full faith
and credit clause as functionally the same for purposes of constitutional
analyses.' 13 The test cited by the Court is that "for a State's substantive
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, the State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair."' 14 According to the plurality, Minnesota had three con-
tacts with the parties and the occurrence giving rise to the litigation that, in
the aggregate, permitted the selection of Minnesota law. 15 The three con-
tacts listed by the court were: (1) Mr. Hague's status as a member of Min-
nesota's workforce; 1 6 (2) Allstate's presence in Minnesota;' 17 and (3) the
fact that Mrs. Hague became a Minnesota resident prior to institution of
the instant litigation. 118
Of these contacts the first is the most significant. Although resident sta-
tus establishes a more important state interest than employment status,
employment in the state is nonetheless sufficient for the application of that
state's laws. The interests of the state of employment are in general analo-
gous to the interests of the state of residence and involve police power
responsibilities, state services and amenities, a concern for the safety and
well being of a workforce, and the "concomitant effect on Minnesota em-
ployers."1" 9 The fact that Mr. Hague was not killed while in Minnesota or
while commuting to work there does not defeat these interests in that the
employment relationship is affected even by the death of an employee in
another state. Further, while Mr. Hague's residence in Wisconsin may
well support application of Wisconsin law, it does not constitutionally
mandate it to the exclusion of Minnesota law.
The second contact identified was Allstate's presence in Minnesota. Be-
cause Allstate was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota, it
could hardly claim surprise with respect to the application of local law,
110. 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1979).
111. 101 S. Ct. at 644,66 L. Ed. 2d at 535.
112. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion.
113. 101 S. Ct. at 637 n.10, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 527 n.10.
114. Id at 640, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 531.
115. Id
116. Id
117. Id at 642, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 533.
118. Id at 643, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 534.
119. Id at 641, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 531.
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especially insofar as it affected a Minnesota resident and a longstanding
member of Minnesota's workforce.
Thirdly, Mrs. Hague became a resident of Minnesota prior to institution
of the litigation. While this factor is insufficient in itself to support a
choice of law, when there is no suggestion that the change in residence was
made for the purpose of "finding a legal climate especially hospitable to
her claim,"1 20 Minnesota at least has an interest in full compensation for
resident accident victims.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens stated that a proper analysis
of choice-of-law questions requires independent review under the full faith
and credit clause and under the due process clause.' 2 ' Justice Stevens ar-
gued that full faith and credit deals with the federal interest in insuring
respect for state sovereignty, while due process deals with the litigants' in-
terest in a fair adjudication of their rights.' 22 Because there was no show-
ing that Minnesota's refusal to apply Wisconsin law posed any direct or
indirect threat to Wisconsin's sovereignty, and because application of Min-
nesota law did not result in unfairness to either litigant, the concurrence
found no constitutional violation to exist. 123 Justice Stevens reached this
conclusion even though he regarded the decision to apply Minnesota law
as unsound as a matter of conflicts law.' 24
The dissent 25 agreed with the plurality that the due process and full
faith and credit clauses form a single unit for constitutional review in
choice-of-law cases.' 26 According to the dissent, two enduring constitu-
tional policies were implicated: first, a concern that the contacts between
the forum state and the litigation not be so slight and casual that applica-
tion of forum law would be fundamentally unfair to a litigant; 127 secondly,
a showing that the forum state has a legitimate interest in the outcome of
the litigation before it.128
The dissent found that the litigants in this case, Allstate and the insured,
had no reasonable expectations that were frustrated.' 29 Looking at the
contractual relationship between the parties at the time of its execution, the
dissent concluded that the risk insured was not geographically limited in
that Hague commuted daily to Minnesota and there was a reasonable
probability that the risk would materialize there. 130 As the dissent noted,
"[t]he fact that the accident did not, in fact, occur in Minnesota is not
controlling because the expectations of the litigants before the cause of ac-
120. Id. at 643, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 534.
121. Id at 645, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 536.
122. Id. at 644, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 535.
123. Id at 647, 650, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 538-39, 542.
124. Id at 646, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 537.
125. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powel's dissenting opin-
ion. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
126. 101 S. Ct. at 650, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 543.
127. Id at 651, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 543.
128. Id at 651, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 544.,




tion accrues provide the pertinent perspective." 131
But the dissent could find no showing that the forum state had a legiti-
mate interest in the outcome of the litigation before it.132 The dissent ex-
amined the three contacts cited by the plurality 33 and found that they
failed to establish a connection between Minnesota and the issues in litiga-
tion. 134 The dissent stated that the post-accident change of residence was
constitutionally irrelevant because of precedent 35 and because any other
view would invite forum shopping, defeat the defendant's reasonable ex-
pectations at the time the cause of action accrued, and give effect to unre-
lated facts and rules.136 The dissent emphasized that the fact that Allstate
did business in the forum state was meaningful as a separate factor only as
to property, persons, or contracts executed within or to be carried out
within the forum state. 137 Finally, the dissent viewed the fact that the in-
sured was a member of Minnesota's workforce as providing no contact in
that the question of payment of benefits to the estate of a nonresident em-
ployee hardly furthers any substantial state interest relating to employ-
ment. 138 As the dissent pointed out: "The substantive issue here is solely
one of compensation, and whether the compensation provided by this pol-
icy is increased or not will have no relation to the State's employment poli-
cies or police power."' 39
In sum, the Supreme Court decision in Hague stands for the proposi-
tions that there is no constitutional review of choice-of-law methodologies
as such and that the due process and the full faith and credit clauses pro-
vide only a modest check on state power in this area. Unfortunately, the
exact test and its underlying policies remain in doubt. Of the three ap-
proaches, that of the dissent seems the best.
B. From Lex Loci to the Restatement-The Choice of
Law Rule in Texas
Last year's Survey article discussed in detail the case of Gutierrez v. Col-
lins140, in which the Texas Supreme Court adopted the most significant
131. Id at 653, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 546 (emphasis in original).
132. Id
133. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
134. 101 S. Ct. at 653-54, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 546-48. Important to note is the difference in
the formulation of the test for sovereign interests adopted by Justice Stevens in concurrence
as compared to that used by Justice Powell in dissent. Justice Stevens argues that a forum's
choice of law is constitutionally invalid only upon a showing of improper interference with
some other sovereign, id at 647, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 538-39, while Justice Powell stresses the
need of the forum affirmatively to show sufficient contacts. See id at 651, 66 L. Ed. 2d at
543.
135. Id at 653, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 546 (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299
U.S. 178, 182 (1936) and Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930)).
136. 101 S. Ct. at 653, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 546.
137. Id
138. Id at 654, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 547.
139. Id
140. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); see Newton, supra note 47, at 397.
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relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 14 as to personal
injuries suffered in another jurisdiction. 142 During this survey period addi-
tional Texas cases dealt with choice of law.
The Texas Supreme Court in Robertson v. Estate of McKnight 14 3 ad-
dressed the question of whether the Texas doctrine of interspousal tort im-
munity bars a suit by the wife's estate against the husband's estate for
wrongful death resulting from a plane crash in Texas. In December 1974 a
plane took off in New Mexico, with Byron McKnight, the pilot, and
Amelda McKnight, his wife and passenger. The plane crashed in Texas,
killing both. Byron and Amelda, both domiciliaries of New Mexico, in-
tended to return to New Mexico and their only connection with Texas was
the fact that the accident occurred in that state. 144 Roberston, the executor
of the wife's estate, sued the husband's estate for wrongful death in a dis-
trict court in Travis County, Texas.
The trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion,
holding that Texas law applied and barred the action under the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity. 145 The court of civil appeals at Tyler affirmed,
holding that article 4678,146 as it existed at the time of the crash, applied
and mandated application of Texas law.' 47 According to the court, the
alteration of article 4678148 to allow a free choice of law did not apply in
the case at bar because the amendments occurred after the date of the
crash.' 49 The court noted that because the amendments were substantive
they were not to be given retroactive effect absent a clearly expressed legis-
lative intent.' 50 The court found no such intent with regard to the amend-
ments in question.' 15 The supreme court, however, reviewed article 4678
and concluded that it "only applied to deaths or injuries that occurred
outside Texas."' 52 Article 4678 had no application, therefore, because the
death in question occurred in Texas. The court held that the applicable
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971).
142. 583 S.W.2d at 318.
143. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 74 (Nov. 15, 1980).
144. Id. at 75.
145. 591 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979).
146. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 156, § 1, at 365.
147. 591 S.W.2d at 643.
148. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
149. 591 S.W.2d at 643.
150. Id at 644.
151. Id. at 644-45 (citing Penry v. William Barr, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D. Tex.
1976); Gutierrez v. Collins, 570 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1978), af d, 583
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Cass v. Estate of McFarland, 564 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1978, no writ)).
152. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 74 (emphasis in original) (citing Brown v. Seltzer, 424 S.W.2d
671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [I st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Baum Media Sales & Marketing, Inc., 617 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1980) (judgment for insurer
on ground that policy was void ab initio under Louisiana law was premature because choice
of law was unresolved); Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (Texas law applied to product liability and to contribution claims, but Canadian law
applied to nonpecuniary damages claim); Hayward v. Southwest Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp.,
476 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (under 1975 amendment to Texas Wrongful Death Act,
Texas courts may apply Arkansas statute when deceased killed in Arkansas).
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Texas statute was the pre-1975 amendment form of article 4671.153 Look-
ing at that provision, the supreme court declared that "[alrticle 4671 con-
tained no statutory choice of law to be applied in wrongful death actions
where the death occurred in Texas."' 54 Choice of law, therefore, was to be
determined by the common law of Texas. 55
Until Gutierrez v. Collins156 Texas followed the rule of lex loci delicti as
to choice of law. In that case, the supreme court adopted the most signifi-
cant relationship doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Second). 157 The
supreme court in Robertson held that the Restatement applied to inter-
spousal tort immunity and that it applied to this cause of action even
though the case arose prior to the Gutierrez decision. 58 Based on section
169 of the Restatement, the court concluded that the decedents' domicile
would control choice of law.' 59 As a result of Robertson little doubt exists
that in Texas the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts applies to choice of law
questions where not prohibited by statute.
The Robertson court also discussed whether New Mexico law, which
permits spouses to recover from each other for negligently infficted inju-
ries, violated good morals, natural justice, or was prejudicial to the general
interests of Texas citizens.' 60 Both as a matter of common sense and be-
cause a larger number of states' 61 allow interspousal suits, the court deter-
mined that the rule did not violate good morals or natural justice. 62
Further, the court noted that when both spouses involved are New Mexico
domiciliaries, failure to apply a Texas rule designed to protect domestic
tranquility and conform with special marital property laws would not
prejudice Texans. 163
Two rather specialized cases of importance to choice of law questions
were decided during the survey period: Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v.
Hutcheson-Ingram Development Co. 164 and Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V. 1 65
Woods-Tucker, involving a chapter XI bankruptcy proceeding, posed the
question whether a particular transaction was in fact a sale-leaseback or
was instead a usurious secured loan. Citing Professor Moore, the court
noted that in federal matters a federal court is not bound by the forum
153. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 74-75.
154. Id at 75.
155. Id
156. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
157. Id at 318.
158. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 75.
159. Id
160. Id; see Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979); California v. Copus,
158 Tex. 196, 203, 309 S.W.2d 227, 232 (1958).
161. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970).
162. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 75.
163. Id
164. 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980). [Editor's Note: After this Article went to print the
Fifth Circuit, on petition for rehearing, withdrew and vacated its previous opinion, substitut-
ing a new opinion in its place. No. 79-1651 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 1981). The court upheld the
contractual choice of law allowed by the UCC and affirmed the judgment of the district
court. Id., slip. op. at 5545. This case will be discussed at length in next year's Survey.]
165. 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980).
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state's conflicts rules.' 66 Instead, the court stated that a bankruptcy court
should look to the law of the state with the most significant contacts to the
transaction when federal law does not offer a controlling answer.167 As the
court viewed the facts, Texas had the most significant contacts with the
transaction at issue.' 68 The contract in question, however, contained a
choice of law clause stipulating that it was to be governed by Mississippi
law. According to the majority, Texas choice-of-law rules in usury cases,
like Texas usury laws, were designed and have been interpreted to protect
Texas borrowers.169 The court noted that when a Texas borrower trans-
acts in Texas, a contractual provision choosing a law other than Texas law
may be ignored if it amounts to a device to evade the usury laws of
Texas.' 70 In such cases, the court stated that Texas usury law is to be ap-
plied.' 7' Because the provision named a state that had no interest in the
application of its own usury laws, the court concluded that Texas usury
laws should apply despite the parties' contrary stipulation.172
In his dissent Judge Tate agreed that Texas choice of law should ap-
ply,173 but argued that such a rule must be attuned to commercial law and
to Texas's commitment to the overriding policy of national uniformity that
was ratified by the Texas Legislature when it adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.' 74 In light of the applicable UCC provisions, 75 the dissent
would have upheld the parties' contractual choice of law. 176
Fisher v. Agios 177 dealt with the proper relationship between choice of
law factors and the issue of forum non conveniens in an admiralty case. A
Greek citizen, hired in Greece, came to Beaumont to serve on a vessel
owned by a Liberian corporation and operated by a Panamanian corpora-
tion. Nine days after joining the crew he was killed in an onboard acci-
dent. His surviving widow and dependents sought recovery in a United
166. 626 F.2d at 406 (citing IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, pt. 2, $ 0.325 (2d ed.
1980)),
167. 626 F.2d at 406 (citing Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S.
156, 161-62 (1946)).
168. 626 F.2d at 406.
169. Id at 406-10 (citing Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90 Tex. 480, 39 S.W. 656
(1897); Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891); High Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing
Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ);
Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 123, 183-88 (1967), and distinguishing Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp.,
474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ refed n.r.e.)); cf. R. LEFLAR,
supra note 1, § 152 (discussing cases that uphold a contract if its rate of interest is permitted
by any state to which the contract is substantially related).
170. 626 F.2d at 407.
171. Id at 409.
172. Id at 414.
173. Id at 415.
174. Id
175. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981);
U.C.C. § 1-105(l) (1972 version).
176. 626 F.2d at 421. Justice Tate's position was eventually adopted by the court. See
note 164 supra. Cf. Walker v. Associates Financial Servs. Corp., 588 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1979, writ refed n.r.e.) (if no claim of fraud or subterfuge is raised, choice of
law provision will be upheld).
177. 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980).
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States District Court under the Jones Act and general maritime law. After
a judgment favorable to plaintiffs, defendants appealed, claiming in part
that the trial court should have applied the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens or, in the alternative, that Greek rather than American law should
have applied. The court noted that, although the issues of choice of law
and forum non conveniens share similar elements, the choice of law test set
forth in Lauritzen v. Larsen ' 78 was held not determinative 179 of the forum
non conveniens issue, which the court ruled was controlled by Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert.180 Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not
err in choosing to apply American law.' 8 '
III. JUDGMENTS
Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides: "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."' 182 In the case of judg-
ments, full faith and credit 83 mandates that the general doctrine of res
judicata 84 be applied. Thus if a court with jurisdiction has rendered a
final judgment, that judgment may have no less finality in a sister state.
This doctrine has bound the states together by preventing individuals from
undoing formal determinations by crossing boundary lines.
In the case of rules of law, however, the situation has been quite differ-
ent. 185 Full faith and credit has not been interpreted to mean the same
when applied to public acts as when applied to judicial proceedings.
While the propriety of this dichotomy has sometimes been challenged, 86
especially in the area of workers' compensation, 87 it has been considered
178. 345 U.S. 571, 588-90 (1953); see Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-
09 (1970); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381-84 (1959).
179. 628 F.2d at 313.
180. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
181. 628 F.2d at 318.
182. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The remainder of this section provides: "And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Id
183. This concept should be contrasted with the idea of comity. Comity "is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (emphasis added). The use of
the comity concept does not necessarily result in a mandatory application of res judicata.
184. "The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of all issues connected with a
cause of action or defenses that were actually tried or with due diligence should have been
tried." Newton, supra note 47, at 411 n.184 (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gravis, 470
S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1971)). "The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation between the
same parties in a subsequent suit upon a different cause of action of essential fact issues
actually litigated." Newton, supra note 47, at 411 n. 185 (citing Bensen v. Wanda Petroleum
Co., 468 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1971)).
185. This common sense distinction is reflected in case law even though the language of
art. IV, § 1 does not appear to distinguish between rules of law and judgments.
186. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213-27 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971).
187. See Wolkin, Workmen's Compensation Award-Commonplace or Anomaly in Full
Faith and Credit Pattern, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1944).
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settled law.' 88 The recent case of Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. ,189
however, has considerably altered the settled nature of the law of full faith
and credit.
Thomas, a resident of the District of Columbia and an employee of a
District of Columbia company, worked primarily in the District but also
worked in Virginia and Maryland. While at work in Arlington, Virginia,
he sustained a back injury. Two weeks later he entered into a Virginia
worker's compensation agreement that subsequently was approved by the
Virginia Industrial Commission. More than three years later, Thomas
sought compensation in the District of Columbia under the District of Co-
lumbia act. The primary issue raised was whether the Virginia award con-
strained the District of Columbia from giving a second supplemental
award in light of full faith and credit requirements. 190 Seven Justices con-
cluded that a supplemental award was not barred. 19' Four of those Jus-
tices joined in a plurality opinion 92 that proved to be of interest.
The plurality examined two existing Supreme Court decisions. The first,
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,19 3 held that the full faith and credit
clause precluded an employee who had received a workers' compensation
award from seeking a supplemental award in another state. The second,
Industrial Commission v. McCartin ,94 held that absent "unmistakable lan-
guage" that an initial award was intended to preclude a supplemental
award in another state, such a supplemental award was not foreclosed.195
Finding that subsequent decisions overwhelmingly adopted the McCartin
test, the plurality concluded that Magnolia should be overruled. 196 Al-
though the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act's 197 exclusive remedy
provision was not exactly the same as the Illinois provision involved in
McCartin, it did not, according to the plurality, contain "unmistakable
188. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, §§ 74-75; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 84, §§ 9.3, 9.3B.
189. 100 S. Ct. 2647, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1980). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976), the District
of Columbia is obligated to give full faith and credit to judgments just as is a state. Other
recent developments in the area of judgments include: Royal Bank v. Trentham Corp., 491
F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (rejection of doctrine of reciprocity); General Exploration Co.
v. David, 596 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (plaintiff enti-
tied to judgment for amount of California judgment when defendant permitted judgment to
become final); Cousins v. Cousins, 595 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ
dism'd) (under Oklahoma statute a valid decree of divorce barred wife from claiming bene-
fits in subsequent Texas divorce action); Cobb v. Pratt, 593 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (final partition judgment subject to collateral
attack only in face of jurisdictional defect in prior judgment); Colson v. Thunderbird Bldg.
Materials, 589 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (full faith and
credit clause does not prohibit test of foreign forum's jurisdiction); Exxon Corp. v. Butler,
585 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ) (law of case doctrine binds
appellate court to prior decision of former appeal of same case).
190. 100 S. Ct. at 2653, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 763.
191. The majority included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
192. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the plurality opinion.
193. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
194. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
195. Id at 628.
196. 100 S. Ct. at 2663, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 776.
197. VA. CODE § 65.1-1 to -152 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
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language" designed to preclude a supplemental award in another state.198
While the allowance of a supplemental award was acceptable to a ma-
jority of the Justices,199 the four Justices who joined in the plurality opin-
ion were unhappy with the rationale of the McCartin decision. 200 The
plurality implicitly recognized certain "normally accepted full faith and
credit principles," 20' such as the idea that "the judgment of a state court
should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court in the
United States, which it had in the state where it was produced. ' 20 2 Under
this formula, a state might indirectly determine the extraterritorial effect of
its judgment by defining the effect of its judgment within the state. While
the plurality considered this acceptable, it found that the McCarfin rule,
"focusing as it does on the extraterritorial intent of the rendering State, is
fundamentally different" 20 3 because it encourages parochialism. 2°4 The
plurality, therefore, called for a new examination of full faith and credit
principles. 20 5
The plurality then proposed a balancing test involving state interests
without discussing its merits. 206 According to the plurality, Virginia's in-
terest in limiting liability of companies that transact business within its
borders, and the interest of both Virginia and the District in the injured
employee, and Virginia's interest in having the integrity of its formal de-
terminations respected by other sovereigns, represented conflicting legiti-
mate concerns that are to be resolved under the teachings of Alaska
Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission20 7 and its prog-
eny. 20 8 State interests in "compensation policies, ' 209 according to the plu-
rality, are not to be resolved " 'by giving automatic effect to the full faith
and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its
own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental in-
terests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to
their weight.' ",210 This approach, then, requires choice, but does not man-
date a particular choice and would allow an employee such as Thomas to
seek compensation under the scheme of either the jurisdiction where he is
employed or where the accident occurred. 2" Any individual state's inter-
est in limiting potential liability would not be controlling because it would
198. 100 S. Ct. at 2654, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 765.
199. Id. at 2663, 2665, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 776, 778.
200. Id at 2656, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 767.
201. Id at 2655, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 766.
202. Id (citing Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818)).
203. 100 S. Ct. at 2655, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 767.
204. Id at 2656, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 767.
205. Id at 2658-59, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 770.
206. Id at 2659, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 770-7 1.
207. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
208. 100 S. Ct. at 2659, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 771.
209. Id, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 770-71;see Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1965);
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1955).
210. 100 S. Ct. at 2659, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 771 (quoting Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)).
211. This is true whether or not either statute purported to confer an exclusive remedy.
100 S. Ct. at 2660, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 772.
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not be directly achieved. Because both Virginia and the District had an
interest in providing adequate compensation to the injured worker, the
plurality found that the allowance of successive awards presented "no dan-
ger of significant conflict. 212
This analysis is superficially attractive but does not withstand close scru-
tiny. The primary fallacy is that it equates statutes with judgments21 3
without showing that this equality is logically appropriate. As a result,
Virginia's interest in fixing a limit on liability through a judgment 214 is
largely ignored. In addition, by focusing on the fact that the Virginia
workmen's compensation award is not a final judgment made by a tribunal
with choice of law power, the plurality invites the very parochialism that it
condemns. Employers will now be encouraged to turn awards into final
judgments and to lobby for legislative changes to give workers' compensa-
tion boards choice of law power.215
Finally, the plurality opinion's discussion of Virginia's interest in the
integrity of its judicial system misplaces the proper emphasis of full faith
and credit. The collective interest 216 of the United States lies at its heart.
The plurality approach is proper only if it does not undercut the nationally
unifying force of full faith and credit.217
Both concurring and dissenting Justices agreed that application of the
plurality's balancing test could produce uncertainty and undermine the
general purpose of the full faith and credit clause.218 The concurring opin-
ion succinctly noted that the plurality rationale would, after a court-en-
tered judgment in a wrongful death action in one state under the law of
that state, permit the plaintiff to obtain a subsequent judgment in another
state for damages exceeding the first state's liability limit. This result
212. Id
213. The dissent noted this fallacy and referred to Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943), which emphasized the difference
between statutes and judgments after the lower court had failed to make the distinction. 100
S. Ct. at 2667, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 780 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Five of the Justices in Thomas
recognized the statute-judgment dichotomy.
214. Although a workers' compensation award is not technically a judgment, the same
result should apply. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1943).
215. 100 S. Ct. at 2663-65, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 776-78 (White, J., concurring); 100 S. Ct. at
2667, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 780 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. The plurality stated that each state must formulate its policy on whether to allow
supplemental awards, according to its view of its own needs. It attempts to narrow its deci-
sion by stating: "We simply conclude that the substantial interests of the second State in
these circumstances should not be overridden by another State through an unnecessarily
aggressive application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause .... . 100 S. Ct. at 2663, 65 L.
Ed. 2d at 776. In support of this, the plurality cites Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S.
202, 227 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting). The Restatement states that a judgment rendered in
one state need not be recognized in another state if not required by the natural policy of full
faith and credit; to require otherwise would be improper interference in the affairs of a sister
state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971). Contra Ehrenzweig,
The Second Conflicts Restatement.- A Last Appealfor its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1230, 1240 (1965).
217. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948).
218. 100 S. Ct. at 2665-68, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 776-80; see Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315
U.S. 343, 348-49 (1942).
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would be a revolutionary development sorely testing tenets of finality and
national unity.

